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0 ,. l--i·ecord lives up to Orff motto: '' No
m~ .;ion too dijfic11lt, no sacrifice too
g reat." The press and tire h1storia11s
have, a11d wil[ always pay tribute lo tire
"Fif<lr ling First " as a great division;
but I want lo take this opportunity to
,·ecogni1e you as individual soldie,·s.
Your co11rage, your cagi11ess, yo111· team work, a11d you,· spirit are ever E'resent .
Tire German has learned to ;ea,· the
wearer of tire "Red One." The unmerciful beating you have given him ill many
engagements; yo11r desil"e to close wit!, liirn and kill liave made
it so. As long as we continue lo have men like you, we will g o
/orwa ~d - always forwa,·d - fo, -ward to the ·next objectii•e.

_£.JJ/4/~
Maj or G~ne n1 l , C o mmandin~

\)

'i)a:,~ ······················································· - - - -- - - -

QN ·April 22, 1944, General Field Marshal Erwin Rommel

issued an order to all troops defending Western Europe :
"We must succeed in the short time left until the ·offensive
1tarts, in bringing all defenses to such a standa/d fhat they
l

will hold up against the strongest attack . Never in lliato
was there a defense of such an extent with such an obstacle
as the sea. The enemy must be apnihilated before he reaches
our main battle field I"
Along the strip of coast near Colleville-sur-Mer. Normandy,
France , Der Fuehrer's chain g~g boys, the Todt workers.
must have smiled confidently when they read the order.
If the Allies struck here, they also would strike sharpened
stakes, ramp obstacles, steel "Element C" obstacles, "hedgehogs," tetrahedra and curved r?-ils. They would be blown
to bits by floating mines, wired µrines, mines buried in lig~t
sand and gravel. If infantry managed to smash through , 11
would find itself on a beach fiat as a billiard table except
for a two-foot embankment on the land sjde where the pebbly
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shale met the turf. Jn front would be a double-apron wire,
concertinas and knife-rests criss-crossing carefully laid
mine fields . It also would find itself fa cing a 100-foot cliff
harborin_g sunken concrete pillboxes . From them, 57mm
and 75mm anti-tank guns and 20mm machine guns would
pour enfilading fire up and down the beach area . Defiladed
behind the ridge were mortars . Manning the defenses at
all times was at least a battalion and a half of seasoned infantrymen . In reserve were three full regiments, a mobile
brigade and thr ee mobile battali6ns .
The commander of the 1st Inf. Div. , the unit selected to
land hete , knew all this . He also knew that in the Cerisy
Forest , 15 miles to the rear, the 352nd Inf. Div. was on the
alert as a reserve .
What he didn't know was that two days before June 6, 1944 ,
the greater part of this enemy division had bivouacked in
the Colleville beach area for anti-invasion manuevers.
M

ANY accounts have been written of the ·]\me 6 assa1,1lt
on the West Wall, and
\
stories will continue to flow
.-- -;I,. ofP < ,.---:: ~,~
long after the Q-Day tumult has .
- ~ ~ "":;;~~
died away . But it was of the ~
,
~ -•,"" :· ll _..
1st Div . landings that Ernie Pyle
~P?ke wh~n he said, "Now that ~ •'"- • 1t 1s over 1t seems to me a pure ..--:: • --s- r-:;;:;
miracle- that we ever took the beach at all."
There was confusion, yes . Many units had 30 per cent
casualties in the first hour of fighting . Assault boats, mined
and shelled , piled upon obstacles and formed additional
obstructions . Men were cut down as their landing craft
3
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of 88s , and the crack of automatic guns . The haze of drifting
cordite smoke already partly obscured the beach.
Leading the assault , the 2nd Bn . was pinned down on the
beach by furious fire fr om those fortifications which had
withstood severe naval and air b ombardment. The 3rd
Bn . landed on the left of the beach and , disregarding mortars
and machine guns , fought inland up a deep draw , destroying
strongpoints as it went along . The 1st Bn . landed behind
the immobilized 2nd . Reorganization of the scattered and
riddled units was accomplished under continued heavy
fire . Meanwhile , casualties continued to mount . It was at
this critical moment that Brig Gen . George A. Taylor , assistant division commander , then Colonel in command of the
16th Inf. Regt. , expressed the too-dogged-to-quit spirit
saying, "Hell , we 're dying here on the beach . Let 's move
inland and die ."

dropped the ramp or died wac:Hng through the aurf,
few or the early assault wavu, having gained the
shelter ot the abale ledge, were riddled by artillery bul'III,
Most supporting weapons were swamped or destroyed en
the beach . It would be futile to minimize the destruction or
deny the disorganization. It was hell I
But what is significant is that the division came through
the interlaced system of obstacles to destroy the entira
German 352nd I.ilf. Div. and it pushed ahead until ordered
to stop . The 1st came through on knowledge based on
e xperience , on planning and guts .
The sea-borne invasion of the continent started June 6 .
When the 2nd and 3rd Bns . of the 16th Combat Team debark. ed from transports to landing craft at 0630 they assaulted
Omaha Beach north of Colleville-sur-Mer . The men knew
it wasn 't going to be easy when they saw the pattern of
flying metal at the water 's e dge , heard the whoom ! whoom I
4

QNE group of the

!st Bn . blasted a gap in the wire ; what
was left of the unit crawled through minefields to capture
the ridgeline overlooking the beach . The 1st and 2nd Bns .
cleared Colleville-sur-Mer . Behind this driving point the
division picked itself up fr om the sand and surged inland ,
still meeting stubborn resistance from the outnumbering
Germans .
·
•

When elements of the 7th FA Bn . landed at H-Hour , half
of its guns had been destroyed. Eight hours later it fired
its first mission . In the meantime . men grabbed their rifles
and fought with the infantry .
At 1300 the 18th Combat Team landed . By mid-afternoon
the 2nd Bn . of the 18th was in Colleville-sur-Mer . Firing
batteries of the 32nd FA Bn . went into p osition ai 2045 , al5

· though 25 vehicles and two guns had been lost in the surf.
The 26th Combat Team came in at 1700 through mortar and
artillery shells still showering the beach . The 1st and 2nd
Bns. were abreast with the 3rd in reserve . Despite heavy
lo,qses, the 3rd Bn. was the first unit of the division to take
lts Army objective .
During the next week the 1st Div. slashed inland 23 miles
to Caumont, making the farthest southern penetration of the
beachhead, and halting only to allow friendly units to draw
abreast and cover its,, dangerously exposed flanks . Other
units never did pull onto line ; for one month the division
held its narrow salient. On June 21 Field Marshal Bernard
L. Montgomery complimented Maj . Gen . C . R. Huebner,
stating that the action of the division in seizing and holding Caumont
so upset the Germans ' plans that it
was necessary for them to alter
their prepared plans . and commit
their hoarded counter-attack forces .
The first phase of the offensive had
ended with the destruction of one German division and disruption of allelements initially opposing the assault.
On July 2, when Gen . Dwight D.
Eisenhower presented decorations
to men who made the initial assault,
he said , "I know your record from
the day you landed in Africa , then
Sicily. I am beginning to think that
the 1st Div . is a sort of Praetorian
Guard . .."

·en,
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.
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THEY
were not new to combat, these men who drove
through the West Wall and chewed up the "supermen"
defending it. They were members of an infantry division
only too well known in the archives of the German Army,
a division which had never failed to take an objective or
accomplish a mission, a division which had been last in
nothing except its departure from the field of battle and whose
record is appropriate to its name.
The oldest in the Army today, constituted during World
War I, the 1st Div. was first to arrive in France . In the last
war it was the first to fire a shell against the foe , first to suffer
casualties, first to capture prisoners , first to repel a German
raid , first to stage a major American offensive, first to enter
Germany and cross the Rhine. It was the first division to
be cited in General Orders . It was the last division to
return to America after Germany's occupation had been
completed .
During World War II it was the first infantry division to
arrive in England , first to invade North Africa, Sicily and
France , and first to smash through the supposedly impregnable fortifications of the Siegfried Line . Maj . Gen . Terry
7

Allen, its fighting commander
through three decisive campaigns, once said, "Nothing
in hell must stop the 1st Division." Nothing has.
The insignia carries a past
hich symbolizes the spirit of
ese fighting doughboys. At
~e battle of Soissons in World
W(r 1, a 1st Div. man cut a
pJece of red cloth from the cap
~ an enemy he had killed,
pinned it to his sleeve . A
CQmment that it looked like
r•d flannels showing through
-. tom coat brought the present
more compact design .
R EGIMENTS which stormed
into France that June day
·had previously taken many
bitterly-held objectives . The
16th Inf., organized in 1798,
I•. fought its way through the
',\far of 1812, Mexican War,
_ _ Civil War, Indian insurrection,
Philippine uprising, Mexican
border incidents, World War I
....and.-sinceNov.8, 1942,World
War II.
The 18th Inf. Regt. first appeared in the War of 1812. On
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May 4, 1861, by direction of Pres . Lincoln, it was reorganized
to participate in the Civil War. Afterwards it was identified
in numerous Indian skirmishes leading to the conquest and
settlement of the American frontier. In the Philippines it
marched against Insurrectionists and Moro headhunters , and ,
following the Spanish-American War , served tours of duty
there,
The 26th Inf. Regt. arrived in Manila, March 18, 1901, and
fought Philippine Insurgents until order was restored. The
regiment was recalled to the U.S ., July 15 , 1903, for duty
along the Mexican border. Again , on May 28 , 1907, it sailed
for the Philippines, serving a tour of duty there until its
return to the States on June 15, 1909 . Stationed in Michigan
until 1913, it was afterward posted to Texas , where it patrolled
the Mexican border until war was declared against Germany .
The call to arms came to the newly-formed 1st Inf. Div . on
June 3, 1917. Among the original members were men from
every state of the Union, and others from Alaska , Hawaii ,
Guam, the Philippines, Panama Canal Zone and Puerto Rico .
Landing at St. Nazaire, France, June 26, the division began
intensive 'training for battle . On Oct. 21, it entered a quiet
sector of the lines on the Lorraine front between Luneville
and Nancy for its first experience in actual warfare . After
30 days of typical trench fighting , it was relieved for an additional period of training.
On Jan . 18, 1918 , it entered the lines again, this time relieving the French Army 's 1st Moroccan Div . and occupying
a sector from Bouconville to Seichprey during three terrible
winter months .
9

The division took and he ld Cantigny against repeated sa v"age
counter-attacks. This was a hard-won victory and important
in that it marked a turning point in the conduct of the war,
from defense to attack .
Relief of the division was completed July 8, after 72 days
in the line . Five days later the men were again in the front
lines, this time in the Marne salient . From July 18 to 23,
they overcame the strongest resistance the enemy could
offer and succeeded in cutting the main supply route of the
salient. At Soissons , the division took its objective only
after casualties had reached a desperate total. Two companies
were wiped out, and the 2nd Bn. came out of action
commanded by a sergeant.
The next offensive began on the heels of the previous one :
reduction of the St. Mihiel salient .
On Oct. 4, the Meuse: Argonne offensive got under way .
During one phase, the division marched and fought for
55 hours without rest or sleep, and the 18th Inf. covered a
distance of 71 kilometers. At the Armistice the division was
at Sedan, farthest American penetration of the war . Gen .
John J. Pershing cited the 1st as "never broken by hardship
or battle ." Marshal Foch conferred upon many Of its units
the Fourragere . Today men still wear the red and green
shoulder piping of the award .

LATE Nov. 7, 1942, 22 ships, pa'.t of the ~-enter Task Force ,
Operation "Torch," swung mto position near Oran to
disemba rk troops . Operation "Torch" was the joint invasion
of North Africa by British and American troops . For 1st
Div . men , it was a baptism of fire. For them it was more
than a trial ; the y were the vanguard of a new American Army ,

Volunteers and regular army men, they were eager for
the job ahead . Combat was a new experience but they had
been prepared by two years of intensive maneuvers at
home , in England and Scotland .
Training of the division had begun with i!B consolidation at
Ft. Devens, Mass., early in 1941. It had the same pride and
long traditions as the old outfit, but it had been shaken down
for speed and stamina . The 28th Inf. had been cut away
and supporting units had been trimmed to a close-knit ,
hard-hitting organization . Division artillery was reduced to
four battalions, the 5th, 7th , 32nd and 33rd .
The 5th FA Bn . was the oldest outfit in the division, tracing
its history back to 1776, when Capt. Alexander Hamilton
formed what is known today as Btry. "D ," 5th FA Bn .
The battery was then called "The Provincial Company of .:,

•"'

the Artillery of the Colony of New York.' ' The first round
ever fired in defense of the United States blazed from Hamilton 's guns July 12 , 1776 , at Ft. George, N. Y. The last round
of the Revolution also was fired by this battery . One of
the most memorable occasions of the war was the battery's
crossing of the Delaware with Gen . George Washington ,
Dec . 25, 1776 . At the close of the war, it was stationed at
West Point. Its complement of 40 comprised the entire
American Army.
In 1861 , the battalion was reorganized under the name of
the 5th U.S . Artillery Regt. and during the ensuing years ,
it participated in the Indian ,
~ : ~ - ~~ Mexican, Civil , and Spanish. ' OZ '
American Wars, and the Phil.A-,
ippine Insurrection . In 1916 ,
it was sel~cted as part of ~e
1st FA Bngade to serve with
··
the newly-activated 1st Div .
The first American shells to land on German positions
in World Wfl'!: I were fired from its guns on Oct . 25, 1917.

l
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THE division spent the winter of 194 I loading and landing

on beaches near Buzzards Bay, Mass ., New River, N.C .,
and in Puerto Rico . Units of the 16th and 18th made landings
near Martinique . The following summer , landing operations
were practiced at Onslo Beach , N.C ., and in the autumn all
units participated in First Army North Carolina maneuvers .
After Pearl Harbor , training was intensified. In February
the division moved to Camp Blanding, Fla ., and later to Ft .
Benning, Ga. On June 21, at Indiantown Gap Military Reser- •
vation, Pa ., came the order, "Prepare for overseas movement ."
12

The division sailed from New York, Aug. 2, 1942, crossed
the Atlantic unescorted, landed in Scotland on Aug. 7, and
entrained immediately for Tidworth Barracks, England .
. There ensued a concentrated period of maneuvers ; including more amphibious training nea~ Glasgow . By Oct. 16,
all personnel had been loaded on ships to b~ used m ~e projected invasion . There was one more landing operation , on
Oct . 18 and 19 . By the 26th the convoy was headed out to
sea. Operation "Torch" had begun.
TNDIANTOWN Gap, Tidworth and Glasgow were far away

1-~t 0100 Nov . 8. This was the real thing and as the boys
came in low under artillery shells, machine gun tracers, and
small arms fire, their motions became automatic reflexes:
organize-spread out-stay down-move ahead ... .. . By
morning the African beach had been taken , and the baptism
was over.
Combat Teams 16 and 18, commanded by Maj . Gen . Terry
Allen , landed near Arzew, east of Oran , at 0057 and 0105 ,
Nov . 8. La Macta and Port-aux-Foules fell, St. Cloud was
invested and contained; the teams advanced west to Oran .
Simultaneously, Combat Team 26, commanded by Brig .
Gen . Theodore Roosevelt, came ashore at Les :Anda.l ouses ,
captured Bon Sfer and Ferme <;:o~ier, ~d pushed east to
take the heights of Djebel MurdJadJo, dommating Oran. The
city fell Nov . 10 and the campaign was over the next day.
The initial landing operations successful, the division underwent intensive training near Oran, and from Nov. 19 to Jan.
15, Combat Teams 18 and 26 operated under various French
13

and British commands in Algeria and Tunisia . While on
detached service near Medjez El Bab , the 1st Bn . of the 18th
Inf. made its famous assault on Long Stop Hill, Christmas Day .
Combat Team 18 remained in the lines 48 days, then shifted
immediately to Shiba to stem a German breakthrough .
Combat Team 26 was broken into groups, fighting in Central
Tunisia near the Kairovan and Faid passes and in Ousseltia
Valley . Combat Team 16 went into training and garrison
duties until Jan . 24, when it went into action around Siliana .
Units remaining under division command 'Y(ere chiefly
occupied with holding operations in the Ousseltia Valley
from Jan . 16 to Feb. 19 . A withdrawal and move to Kasserine
Pass was ordered Feb . 19.
Mid-February a strong German attack had developed near
l
Faid Pass. Enemy forces, after overrunning American positions at Sidi Bou Zid , split into three columns and continued to
snake to Sbeitla, Feriana and Kasserine . By Feb . 18, leading
elements of the German force had overrun Sbeitla, arriving
in the vicinity of Kasserine. Next day a savage attack developed from Kasserine toward Thala . Down the long valley
came tanks of Rommel 's 21st Panzer Div ., overruning forward
positions of the 26th Inf. and forcing a withdrawal westward .
Aided by rain and fog, Germans infiltrated through the Pass ·
and continued northwest. But their sands were running o~.
Combat Team 16 and Combat Command "B" of the !st Armo~ <
ed Div. counter-attacked and forced the enemy t9,
tire
through the Pass,
~
t·

first strike had been called on Rommel . The second
THEfollowed
March 17. For the first time since Oran, the
units were brought together undet division control . After
a spectacular 40-mile night move , the 16th and 18th Combat
Teams launched an attack which engulfed Gafsa and the territory around Feriana . The 26th pushed on toward El
Guettar , in the face of full-scale counter-attacks and continuous
aerial bombardment.
El Guetta.r was attacked March ?.l after the 26th Inf. with
the 1st Ranger Bn . and Co . "D" (Provisional) , 1st Engr_. Combat
Bn . attached, marched IO miles over rugged mountain terram
to occupy a covering position previous to the attack . At
0300 , Combat Team 18 was in attack position with the Isl Bn .,
26th Inf. , alongside .
The assault was a complete success. Commanding high
ground was taken , 700 prisoners were captured. The division sustained four attacks from German 10th Panze r Div.
March 23 . Although tw o battalions were cut off and German
• tanks were between the 18th Inf. CP and the 5th and 32nd
FA Bns. positions, the infantry clung to its position. One
battery of the 5th FA Bn . was cut off, six howitzers were put
15

out of action . All guns of Cos. B and C, 601st TD Bn . and
seven M-l0s of the 899th TD Bn . were lost . Thirty, possibly
40, enemy tanks were knocked out . From March 26 to April
14 , advances continued over difficult mountainous terrain .
Strike two spoiled Rommel's hopes of cutting Allied supply
lines , forced him to continue his retreat northwest . Marshal
Montgomery's Army was cracking the Mareth Line , and the
British near Tunis had a stranglehold on Gen . Von Amim .
The time was ripe for a combined third strike by all Allied
units . The 1st Div . shifted north to Beja and went into battle
near Mateur, April 19 . The attack was aimed at Mateur and
launched over broken , . rocky hills which tore shoes and
clothing . Hill 523 was taken by the l 6th Inf. 's direct assault
in one of the dirtiest , bloodiest battles of the campaign.
Hills 350 and 409 fell to the 18th Inf. The end came q uickly .
On May 7, the day the division was relieved, tatte red
remnants of Rommel 's desert fighters filed d own from Cap
Bon Peninsula . The Afrika Korps was no more .
Of this final stage , Ernie Pyle wrote: "It was a war of such
intensity as Americans on this side of the ocean had not
known before . It was a battle without letup . It was a war
of drenching artillery and hidden mines and walls of machine
gun fire and even of the barbaric bayonet . It was an exhausting , cruel , last-ditch kind of war, and those who went through
it would seriously doubt that war could be any worse ... "
Yet, because of those who slugged it out on the dustwhipped plains of northern Africa , the division had passed
through its novitiate and become a skilled , mature , battlewise organization .
There were some who said that the landings at Gela ,
16

Sicily, were easy, but for men who storm ashore in dawn,
landings never are easy .
- Assault boats were lowered into the water just after midnight July 10, hit the beach at 0245 . Initial resistance was
overcome ; the town of Gela was taken much as was Arzew
on the previous landing .
Operations proceeded smoothly until 1030 on July 11 . Gela
overlooks a coastal plain sloping toward the sea . Far to the
north could be seen approaching the first formation of the
Hermann Goering Panzer Regt.-50 heavy and medium tanks .
They continued until they had pushed within 1000 yards of
the beach itself. Doughboys held their ground , even with
tanks to the -rear of their positions. Supporting fire became
stronger . By 1400 the assault was smashed , the Germans
withdrew .
Then began a campaign remembered not only for the rapid
succession of short, ~erce battles which marked the division's
progress north and east , but for the hills and cliffs up which
men, like herculean ants , inched their way , sometimes
climbing only by the aid of ropes and cleats . Passes were
few , trails so narrow and tortuous that often only mules could
negotiate them .
Despite these obstacles and bitter enemy resistance, the
advance never stopped. Successively, Niscemi, Ponte
Olivo Airport, Mazzarino , Barrafranca, Villa Rosa, Enna,
Alimena, Boumpietro, Petralia , Gangi , Sperlinga , Nicosia ,
Mistreeta , Cerami and Gagliano fell .
Mazzarino was taken July 14 . Two days later, capture of
the heights around Barrafranca severed the main east-west
road and railway lines of Sicily. From here to Gagliano ,
17

campaign ended Aug. 16 . In 37 days of continous fighting ,
the division had taken 18 towns . Palma di Montechiaro
served as the rest and training area while the division awaited
further orders .

THE division sailed from Augusta for the British Isles , Oct.

23 . Maj . Gen . Clarence R. Huebner , who had assumed
command on Aug. 7, 1943 , immediately inaugurated an intensive training program .

resistance
himself from the

.

ap in the west .

Troina · was the hardest battle of the campaign . Tile
Germans had dug in on excellent defensive terrain . They
commanded the city from the north,· west and south . The
town itself was an excellent OP and artery for communication
and supply . Using Troina as a shield to cover withdrawal
of forces from the south and central sectors, the Germans
staged one of their last ditch defenses . Division units
attacked along ridge lines from east and west, sto_rrning
sheer rocky hills and mountainsides against savage fire
from all types of weapons, and took the town after six days of
fighting. On Aug. 6, the 18th Inf. turned the flank of the enemy on Mount Pellegrino, overlooking Troina after a frontal
assault by the 16th Inf. The 26th cut the Troina-Randazzo
road and the enemy fled north . During the battle , the 7th FA
Bn. alone fired 9565 rounds and the division withstood 21
counter-attacks.
This was the lst"'s final action in Sicily , although it later
advanced to Randazzo against light enemy resistance . 'fhe

Rifle marks!11anship , s treet fighting , n ver crossings, arnllery practice , anti-aircraft and night fighting; long marches ,
close order drill, schools in chemical warfare, radio communication , identification of aircraft and armored vehicles ,
and waterproofing ; CP exercises, amphibious warfare ,
hardening exercises-all were stressed . There was little
time for play, less fo r passes to London .
Intelligence believed the West Wall of France would be
hard to crack . Nothing was left to chance . Particular
emphasis was p laced on pillbox assault , and a new method
for reduction of concrete emplacements was devised and
practiced . Two landing exercises , complete in every
detail, were staged.
More and more attention was given to the big guns . German prisoners in previous campaigns had expressed fear of
American " automatic" artillery and testified to the effectiveness of the 105s and 155s The four FA battalions, ·under
the command of Brig . Gen. Clift Andrus, had more than once
proved their superiority to German weapons and their
ability to smash a counter-attack , or softe,n and crumble
stubborn strongpoints for assaulting doughs . Like the regiments they supported , they knew the score .
19
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THE

battle of Normandy was strategically divided into
three parts-first , the assault; then the secunng of the
beachhead and the build-up of supporting forces ; finally,
the most spectacular operation of all-the breakthrough .
Again the 1st led the parade .
Plans called for a breakthrough west of St . Lo to capture
Marigny and then a swing west to Coutances . The object
was to bottle up approximately 30 ,000 troops in the pocket
formed , open the route south down the Cotentin Peninsula
to Brittany. For a month and a half, personnel and supplies
had been funneling into the beachhead , and by July 25 it
was ready to burst .
' An aerial bombardment of the immediate front preceded
the jumpoff. At 1000, July 25 , planes began to come overheavy bombers , mediums , fighter-bombers and fighters .
Three thousand planes , including escorts , dropped 6000
tons of bombs on a saturation area two miles wide . Artillery
took over and maintained a heavy barrage in front of assaulting
troops. The 4th and 9th Divs. forced a gap, and the 1st,
with the i 8th lnf. spearheading , passed through the 9th ,
captured Marigny and rolled west to Coutances , reaching

,
its objective Ytithin threeJlys . The fr~nt line ~r.ust of d~
fense was broken and Germans already showed signs of a
disorganization which was to increase steadily in the next
month as the Allied juggernaut crashed through France and
Belgium.
.

The story of the following month's fighting is one of blitzkrieg warfare at its most effective continual movement
constant pressure , rapid surprise by armored and motor~
ized combat teams and by-passing of strong points, later
cleaned out by follow-Up troops. For the footsloggers it
was a weary succession o~ foxholes all the way across
France; removing mines and road-blocks , building and
repairing roads and bridges, mopping up nasty little pockets
of machine gun and mortar fire , destroying or capturing
vehicles, ammunition and stores; . and always sniper fire,
ambushes , prisoners and forced marches with little sleep or
rest . A recitation of localities exploited is a travelogue from

20
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Brittany east across France to Belgiwn : Gav ray , Bracy ,
Juvigny Le Tertre, Mortain , Mayenne , Lessay , La Ferte
Mace, Etampes, Corbeil , Melun, Meaux and Soissons .
The Germans stumbled backward, commandeering every
possible means of transportation, both civilian and military ,
laying mines and booby traps, blowing up bridges .

T HESE delaying devices failed to stop the division for
long . One reason was the efficient work of the 1st
Engr. Bn. Like other members of the team, the engineers
were not rookies in combat. They are, in fact, the oldest
engineer outfit in the Army. The battalion saw its first
service in Mexico during the Vera Cruz expedition, later
participated in the Civil and Spanish-American Wars . As
the First Regiment of Engineers, it joined the 1st Div . at
Monaucourt, France, Sept. 2, 1917. Final reorganization was
in October, 1939, when the 1st Bn. of the regiment became
the 1st Engineer Battalion (Combat). Another reason for
the speed of the cross-country hike was the 1st Recon .
Trp., which scouted sometimes as much as 50. miles ahead
of the doughfeet, knifing deep into enemy country .
For the first ten days after the Marigny breakthrough .
e front line still was fluid and the division moved rapidly,
ing forward in quick advances to occupy as much
· as poss·
, From Coutances the direction was
to Mortain , southeast to Mayenne,
northeast apd east to !he Seine. Midt~r~io,
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from the south on the famed "Falaise Gap ." On Aug . 24 ,
all units moved 110 miles to the vicinity of Chartres , and
in the next six days advanced to the Seine . The historic
crossing of this river was made on the 27th at Corbeil and
Melun. Two days later, the division crossed the Mame
and on the 31st Soissons fell-Soissons, where the division
had lost 9000 men in four days a quarter of a century before .
For Gen . Huebner, it was the second campaign through
the area . In the last war, he commanded a battalion in the
1st Div .; this time he commanded the division itself.
Average daily moves were 20 miles . The last week of
August alone carried the division 300 miles across northern
France . Only scattered resistance was made by the enemy,
proof of the destruction and defeat suffered by the great
German Army of the West. Mute
evidence was seen along the route
in the columns of smashed enemy
vehicles and eCJllipment.
The liberation continued in September from Soissons across th-i
Aisne River, and included Laon in
France, and Maubeuge, Bavai,
Charleroi, Namur , Liege and
Herve in Belgiwn.
On Sept. 1 an estimated 120,000
enemy troops still remained south
of the Belgian border . The Germans , however, made only slight
., '-...., ·
attempts to hold coordinated " · L.,.
positions ; their main objective

f

This was the situation : the 3rd Armd . Div ., operating on
the lst's right on Sept. 2, had pushed a long finger north
into Belgium east of Mons , cutting across the intended escape
route of five German divisions . Three had been drawing
back into the 1st Div. sector, the other two were retreating
on the left. These units had been directed to make an orderly
withdrawal and occupy the Siegfried Line before the Americans arrived.

apparently was to reach the Reich border before American
units . Many of the foe were left behind in the rapid withdrawal, and the 1st was kept busy mopping up as well as
s_o rtin~ out a vast amount of enemy materiel , including gasoline , tires and food . Several units lived on German rations
for m~re than a week . During the first days of September,
390 pnsoners of war , representing 24 different units , passed
through the PW cage, an indication of the enemy's confusion .
These men were picked up in small actions as the division
progressed northward in the direction of Mons .

,-

Th~ steamroll.e r advance was so long and so rapid that
Special Troops at times had great difficulty maintaining service for the front lines . Nevertheless , they succeeded .
The 1st Medical Bn., despite tremendous problems incident
to moving its installations every few days, kept all casualties
moving through its clearing stations at high speed .

1

BY Sept. 3, an advancJ unit had crossed the Belgian border

and reported contact with a large body of enemy streaming eastward in the direction of Charleroi. It was the
opening gambit of one of the most costly single _g.,tfeatB
suffered by the enemy in the Franco~
?
Belgian campaign.
• ' iii\
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THEY
were well on their way when they collided with the
flank of the 3rd Armd . Div. southeast of Mons . As they
attempted to punch through , their southern flank was suddenly attacked by the 1st Div. combat teams in the vicinity of
Bavai, Riez de Lerelle and Maubeuge. Late Sept. 3, enemy
casualties were estimated at 7000-5000 captured and 2000
killed and wounded . What resistance was set up centered
around Bavai and Maubeuge; otherwise, enemy action was
chaotic. Almost equally disastrous was the loss of materiel,
including a Mark V tank , which, during the height of the
confusion , obligingly followed a column of division transport into a motor pool at the signal of an American MP .
Large groups of enemy were left wandering around the
division area . Eighty anti-aircraft personnel led by a major
mistakenly attempted to march through the division CP in
an effort -to get out. At Bavai, one company of the 1st Bn. ,
18th Inf., in five hours of fighting, killed or wounded 200
Germans, captured 460 prisoners and much equipment .
During a night assault by a whooping, fanatical enemy,
the 26th Inf. netted 700 PWs .
Throughout the ensuing three days , thero were no front
lines . Enemy units continued to fight their way out of the
division area . Some finally arranged meticulous surrenders .
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Th<! 2nd Bn. of the 16th Inf. took more than 2000 prisoners
in one negotiated surrender and felt itself repaid in some
measure for D-Day . Other hostile groups made stray ·
counter-attacks in an attempt' to b reak out. On Sept. 7, the
total number of. PWs taken during the Mons operation was
17,149, of which more than 300 were officers . These last
included General Wahle , 712th Inf. Div , his staff and Col.
Hesse, former commandant of the Seine District and a close
friend of Field Marshal Rommel.

THESept.
divis_ion closed upon objectives in the vic.imty of J\lamur _
8 and found the path to Liege open . Although
opposition was light, the Germans were beginning to organize a defense . Their problem, however , was to gain time
to set up an effective line . Mines were reported for the
first time near Verviers . As the division cros~ed the Meuse
at Liege and moved on towards Herve , the enemy maintained
a heavy reconnaissance screen . Hostile artillery appeared
for the first time since the entry into Belgium . After the
fall of Liege , and as the division pushed on toward Aachen
and the Siegfried Line , more rehabilitated enemy units reappeared . The advance began to bog down . Resistance
was ineffectual. Co . C, 16th Inf . , nui::hed to the Siegfried
Line Sept. 12 and at 1515 crossed the last frontier. Deployment of division forces on this day was intemational--"<l
battalion in Germany, an outpost in Holland, the main body
of the division in Belgium, a rear echelon in France. A reinforced battalion continued the drive forward, and the same
day pierced the first belt of defenses six kilometers west of
Aachen.
Some pillboxes were fully occupied, mo~e were undermanned , a few were 1,moccupied . Apparent, too , was that
26

were .not 'trained to fi
PWs =;,ere found digging
cations alongside perfectly emplaced and se
boxes.

fortffl%:eable pill-

Progress was slow. The division cleared the dragon's
teeth, part of the defenses of the second belt east of Aachen ,
Sept. 14 . Next day the Siegfried Line was entirely breached.
The break came at a fortuitous time. Enemy defenses were
being built up, artillery was more active, new units were
appearing, repeated counter-attacks were launched .
A new German division , the 12th Inf., appeared Sept. 17
and immediately attempted a powerful counter-attack . The
objective was high ground east of Eilendorf. The attack
was beaten off with heavy enemy losses . Next day another
unsuccessful counter-attack was tried south ofVerlautenheide .
27

Meanwhile, the lst's own punch into Stolberg was being
heavily opposed. The defense was well-coordinated and
stubborn, the terrain well-suited to delaying tactics . Every
house in Stolberg was contested . Enemy artillery was more ,
and more in evidence. Division patrols were blocked as
soon as they crossed the lines . Yet in one attack by the 18th
Inf. in the Eilendorf sector , Sept. 19 , a single company neutralized 19 pillboxes while seizing its objective, Crucifix Hill.

In spite of the enemy 's tenacious defense, reports of PWs
and deserters indicated morale was not sound . Defeatism
was spreading among smaller, makeshift units, little groups
were prepared to surrender at the proper opportunity .
Even so, ·the Germans continued to launch local counterattacks .

WHEN
the battered city of Aachen surrendered under
the grinding pressure of a direct assault by the !st.
Oct . 21, Germany lost more than a cultural and historical
landmark, an armament and coal-producing center, a key
point in Siegfried Line defenses. Aachen also was a symbol
of heroic resitance for the Germans , as Stalingrad had been
for the Russians. Its successful defense was to have been
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a guarantee of the Reich's invulnerability. The German
people had been positively assured that it could not be taken.
Its defenders had been- ordered by the commander of the
Seventh Army to hold to the last man: "Your fight for the
ancient imperial city is being followed with admiration and
breathless expectancy. You are fighting for the honor of
the National Socialistic German Army. " But unlike Stalingrad, Aachen crumbled and Nazi honor received a shattering
body blow.
From the beginning, the Germans, expecting the major
attack to develop from the south, had massed their strongest
29

forces there . Even after Oct. 1, when the city had been
containe<;l on the west, south, and east and division patrols
were probing the inner defenses, the Germans maintained
strong positions in the south, counter-attacking mostly only
to prevent complete encirclement. But the plan came apart
at the seams .
A counter-assault preceded by 3500 rounds of heavy
artillery hit the 16th Inf. from the east Oct. 3. When the
bitter close-in fighting was over, half the attacking force
were casualties and half the big guns were knocked out .
Five days later the 18th Inf. retaliated with a ferocious assault
on Crucifix Hill, commanding ground northeast of the city .
Each pillbox was taken separately after its defenders had
been flushed with flame or by direct artillery fire. At the
same time, the 26th Inf. moved into Forst and Beverau Wood .
With these and the Verlautenheide ridge securely hPld,
the last escape road to thei north was brought under fire
~

'

Again a savage counter~
attack was launched from
/4~
the east . The ferocity of the
,
,,fighting can be judged
~ ,,,.om the fact that after
Co . I, 16th Inf., had beaten
off an assault with bayonets, more than 250 dead
Germans lay in front of the company positions.
The city surrounded, even more bitter fighting for its
rubble-strewn streets was in prospect. An ultimatum for
its surrender was carried into Aachen by the S-2 , 26th Inf. ,

Oct. 10. No answer signal•
led the beginning of the
main attack . Fighter-bombers
hammered defense positions
and artillery pumped 5000
rounds into the eastern end
of the city . For the next
three days the men ground
slowly forward, house by
house, street by street.
Meanwhile, counter-attacks
continued. Another bitter
struggle centered against the
18th Inf. around Crucifix Hill.
An even stronger attack was launched, Oct. 15, by the 3rd
Panzer Grenadier Div. against the 16th Inf. For two days
Germans threw tanks and infantry against the dominating
ridge of Observatory Hill on the northern edge of the city .
Miserable weather prevented use of air support and limited
artillery shoots, but close-in fighting with bayonet and hand
grenade finally beat the attackers to their knees.
While the division parried with one fist it socked hard with
the other . From Oct. 16 on, the enemy was reduced to
parachuting supplies to its garrison defenders . By Oct. 20 ,
remaining resistance centered around Technical High
School on the western edge of town. Next day Col. Gerhard
M. Wilek, commanding officer , surrendered unconditionally .
Big guns were silent over a dead city-a devastation of
burst sewers, broken gas mains, bloated animals, of shattered
glass and dangling power lines, of masses of shapeless
rubble. Not one building remained intact.
31
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SUCH is the story of the 1st Div .

Its continued battle success
is based on training, capable leadership and courage .
Buttnen of the 1st, always fighting for their country 's ideals ,
sometimes fighting merely as an aggressive reaction , or
simply to stay alive, have another motivation : that mysterious mixture of pride and ambition called esprit de corps .
In moments of grave crisis when all other motives have
broken down, as during the bloody five days of Soissons
a quarter of a century ago, and on D-Day beach of Omaha
this time , it has been a cohesive esprit de corps that carried
the 1st through. First Div. men are proud of their slogan ,
"Duty First ," prouder still of "The Red One," symbol of
ship never broken "by hardship or battle,"

"Perhaps e ven greater
mands must yef be -made,
whatever thE>y _ may be,
know that · there will ever be
in the Division that special '.
pride of service and high state
- of morale which cannot be
broken b_y hardship or ba.ttle ...
With -dee~ st ,. everenc
we
mourn our dead ; wi - full
hearts · ·we s1ympathize- with
our woun
' cied; a:nd with • · -ord- ipate, pri4~.
JJiilUt the-- victorious liv,ing of · the immortal
--- First Division."
Gen. C . P. Summerall in a congratulatory message to Gen.
· C.
Huebner, 1944.
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